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Abstract
This article argues that neither borders nor the ways in which migrants see them constitute significant deterrents to the
migrants’ resolve to migrate. The argument is based on an investigation of migrants en route to Europe from the Horn of
Africa and the ways in which they see EU external borders and how that contributes to the decision to migrate. The article
advances critiques of rational choice models of migrant decision-making that are based mainly on economic factors and
contributes to theoretical explanations of why some people in the Horn of Africa migrate irregularly, despite measures
enforced by state authorities to curb their movement. The article draws on a qualitative thematic analysis of personal
face-to-face interviews conducted with migrants from four countries in the Horn of Africa who were in Ethiopia at the
time of the research. In the interviews, there was sufficient evidence that migrants had realistic perceptions of European
borders and that life in Europe might not be rosy. But this did not dampen the resolve to migrate. Solutions other than
those that inhibit movement but understand, are sensitive to and include the perceptions of migrants are more likely to
effectively address challenges associated with irregular migration.
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1. Introduction
Migration and the deaths of thousands of people
attempting to cross the EU external border for refuge,
better life and economic prospectswere among themost
prominent and dramatic events that dominated the first
two decades of the 21st century. This culminated into
the so-called 2015 European migration crisis, in which
over amillion irregularmigrants crossed into the EU from
the Middle East and Africa and allegedly threatened to
undermine the EU culture and single market (Diez, 2019;
Mezei, 2018; Rogelj, 2017). Although themajority of peo-
ple migrating to Europe in 2015 probably came from
Syria, mainstream media and some academic literature
suggest thatmigrants originating fromAfrica through the
Mediterranean Sea significantly contributed to the cri-
sis (Crawley & Skleparis, 2018; Flahaux & de Haas, 2016;
Hammond, 2015; Inwood, 2017; Mackintosh, 2017;
Mussi, 2018; Thorleifsson, 2017). Details of the migra-
tion events of 2015 are significant here because such
events continue into the 2020s. As elaborated shortly,
this article seeks to understand why this is the case
from the perspective of migrants from the Horn of Africa.
Migrants and asylum seekers from this region followed
twomajor routes to reach Europe including, theWestern
Mediterranean from Morocco and Algeria into Spain
and the Central Mediterranean from Tunisia and Libya
through to Italy (Lampedusa). That irregular migration
continues post-2015, with some of it originating in the
Horn of Africa countries of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia
and Sudan.
The EU and member states responded to the cri-
sis by reinforcing respective nation-state borders that
had existed before they established the Schengen Area.
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The Common European Asylum System seemed to have
been thrown into disarray. Particularly noteworthy was
German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s suspension of the
Dublin Regulation in late 2015 in order to accommo-
date Syrian refugees (Holehouse, 2015; Scally, 2019). The
suspension effectively meant that Germany defied EU
rules or the Common European Asylum System, which
required asylum seekers to seek refuge in the first safe
EU country of arrival. This is also noteworthy because, as
Belloni (2016) argues, the Dublin Regulation of the EU
has not been able to prevent refugees from repeatedly
trying to exploit possibilities of achieving legal status in
second EU member states after they arrived in Europe,
despite it being nearly impossible for them to gain asy-
lum in second countries.
In the wake of the 2015 crisis, countries like Germany
at the global level also backed the multilateral process
that led to and culminated in the adoption of the Global
Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM)
in 2018. The assumption behind the GCM is that legal
pathways constitute viable means for addressing irregu-
lar migration. The argument in this regard has, indeed,
been made that irregular migration occurs because the
EU or member states close off legal avenues for admit-
ting regular migrants (Czaika & Hobolth, 2016). The EU
and member state’s responses to the 2015 migration cri-
sis as well as the drafting of the GCM, therefore, both
seem to suggest that irregular migrants remain the tar-
get of restrictivemigration legislation. Three quick points
arise here in relation to what seems to be the major con-
cern that irregularmigrants fromAfrica in particular raise
for governments, academics and anti-immigrant groups
in the EU.
Firstly, some scholars, development and civil soci-
ety organisations strongly indicate that more migration
actually occurswithin Africa than outwardly (Mercandalli
et al., 2019; Nshimbi & Fioramonti, 2016) for it to war-
rant concern within EU countries. Secondly, significant
voluntary, orderly and safe (as opposed to irregular)
migration of the type that the GCM and EU countries
aspire to achieve also actually occurs within Africa than
outward. But thirdly, discourses in policy, public and
academic circles assume that African migrants opt to
engage in irregular rather than regular migration to the
EU (see, e.g., Crawley, Düvell, Jones,McMahon,& Sigona,
2017; Ruedin &Nesturi, 2018; Spencer & Triandafyllidou,
2020). Within those debates, very few examine the role
that the migrants’ resolve to migrate plays in migration
processes, seeing that irregular migration towards the
EU continues to occur. While some studies examine why
unauthorisedmigration occurs, less than a handful really
examine actual individual choices to engage in irregular
migration (Ruedin & Nesturi, 2018). Further still, very lit-
tle is known about the determination andmotivations as
well as how those individuals who opt to engage in irreg-
ular migration perceive processes of migration, espe-
cially physical barriers (like borders) enforced to curb
their movement.
In this article I argue that the borders do not deter
the migrants from their resolve to migrate. Accordingly,
I investigate theways inwhich Africanmigrantswhohave
already started off from their home countries on their
irregular sojourn to the EU perceive the EU external bor-
der and the role of the migrants’ attitudes towards the
borders in the migration process. The article is set out
within the context of the shared concern with irregular
migration which I have highlighted. A proper understand-
ing of individuals’ views of apparent obstacles to irregu-
lar migration—such as borders—is essential to dispelling
misleading assumptions about African migration that
inform purported interventions to solve the problem.
Efforts to protect and secure the EU’s external border
against unwelcome immigration are indeed said to have
failed and the investments poured into them, wasted
(Andersson, 2016; Castles, 2004).
Despite this, it is business as usual for both EU pol-
icy makers and the migrants. There is, however, research
that adds agency to the understanding of African migra-
tion and distinguishes between African people’s aspira-
tions to migrate, the ability to migrate buoyed by their
prosperity, and opportunities that present themselves
for them to migrate (Flahaux & de Haas, 2016). Similarly,
other studies explore aspirations further and add to
them, desire and drivers of migration (Carling & Collins,
2020). These studies question common and widely held
stereotypes of Africa as a continent attempting to escape
poverty, war and pestilence (Flahaux & de Haas, 2016).
I extend these works in an attempt to contribute to
unravellingwhy someAfricans undertake irregularmigra-
tion despite EU states enforcing measures and running
information campaigns to discourage them from migrat-
ing. In the article, I focus on migrants’ resolutions that
inform the ways in which they perceive and respond
to borders as formidable obstacles to their movement.
My central argument is that as far as the migrants are
concerned, borders do not constitute significant obsta-
cles to their intent to migrate. What really matters to
them is what they actually do if or when they encounter
the borders. This argument arises from the response
to the question why Africans from the Horn of Africa
seem so determined and attempt to migrate to Europe,
despite knowing that barriers and challenges exist to
their movement.
Belloni (2016, 2019) has investigated Eritrean
refugees in Italy and why they try to acquire new refugee
status in second EU member countries despite the mea-
sures in the Dublin Regulation designed to stop such
practices as well as a range of risks inherent to irreg-
ular migration. Belloni (2019, p. 1) asks “why gamble
resources, time and energy again for an unsure out-
come,” and uses a theory of gambling to argue that the
refugees in Italy engage in a “migration lottery” of con-
tinuously attempting to proceed to northern European
countries in search of asylum in the hope that it will
be granted. This is because living conditions in Italy are
poor. It is more so because as far as the refugees and
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their relatives are concerned, the refugees had not yet
reached their final destination where they would fulfil
family expectations and find safe havens and degrees of
existential and socioeconomic stability. Belloni empha-
sizes luck, cost and reward of the bet or chances taken
on migrating and the feeling of entrapment in the migra-
tion process already started as factors that compel the
refugees to continue migrating until the process is com-
pleted. Whereas Belloni studies Eritrean refugees in Italy
and their attempts to migrate further beyond to north-
ern Europe, in this study I investigate secondary move-
mentwithin Africa of not only Eritrean but also Ethiopian,
Somalian and Sudanese migrants whose intended desti-
nation is Europe. I examine migrants who face the cer-
tainty of encountering the EU external border and the
possibility of being sent back. Hence, why embark on
such a journey in the first place? The empirical section of
the article will show that the migrants were fully aware
and extremely well-informed about the risks of migra-
tion, conditions in Europe, and border control measures.
Their perceptions are largely accurate and reflect the
reality of EU policies. The key insight that will emerge
from the migrants is their determination to continue the
journey to Europe despite what they know. The theoret-
ical considerations and discussion of data and methods
in the next two section provide the context within which
I discuss these realities in the rest of the article.
2. Migration and the Resolve to Migrate: Some
Theoretical Considerations
Examinations ofmigration decisions suggest the need for
interpretations that go beyond commonly held explana-
tions to better understand migration in the 21st century,
because dominant explanations emphasise rational eco-
nomic choices as drivers of migration. The neoclassical
economics approach, for example, assumes that an abun-
dant supply of labour exists in developing countries and
this contrasts the abundant capital in developed coun-
tries. People from developing countries in search of bet-
ter socioeconomic and living conditions, therefore, make
rational decisions to migrate and take up work in devel-
oped countries. The neweconomics ofmigration comple-
ments the neoclassical economics approach in positing
that an individualmigrant’s extended family helps decide
too as well as shares in the costs and benefits of the indi-
vidual member’s migration.
The push-pull theory assumes rationality of the
migrant too. Wage differentials between the migrant’s
country and the intended destination, levels of labour
supply and demand as well as the migrant’s desire for
greater employment opportunities and aspirations for
higher wages drive them into migrating. A range of fac-
tors within the migrant’s country of origin too such as
conflict, poverty and unemployment influence their deci-
sion to migrate.
These theories are distinct in terms of disciplinary
background but complement each other (Massey et al.,
1993) in the analysis of human migration. Further
attempts to explain migration extend the focus of these
theories to shine the spotlight on migrants’ aspirations,
desire and the drivers of migration (Carling & Collins,
2020). They foreground aspirations and desire and bring
attention to migrants’ subjectivities that interact with
rational economic narratives in explaining drivers of
migration. This article advances narratives of migration
beyond economic rationality. Considering the ways in
which migrants relate to migration possibilities, their
capabilities and desire, the article adds on an examina-
tion of the role that resolutions and perceptions play in
the migration process. Because the informants in this
article had already initiated their migratory journeys, the
article uniquely highlights migrants’ convictions within
motivations that they were better off leaving their
homes than staying (Alpes, 2016; Carling & Collins, 2020).
The article extends this aspect of migrants’ aspirations
and desire in the drive to migrate and demonstrates the
resolve among migrants already in the process of migrat-
ing to proceed to their desired destination, Europe. The
resolve is strongly expressed in the responses some key
informants gave during interviews. This article distin-
guishes itself from many studies of Africa–Europe migra-
tion by engaging with the subject from the viewpoint of
the migrants.
3. Obstacles to Migration and Power of Perceptions:
Methods and Instruments
3.1. Data and Methods
This article follows a qualitative research design. The pri-
mary data, which was collected through interviews, was
subjected to qualitative content analysis. After it was
prepared and organized for analysis, a lot of effort was
made to carefully identify and then group the data into
common and recurring themes found in the interview
responses. The themes spoke tomigrants’ perceptions of
borders, the impact of various kinds of information from
a variety of sources on decisions to migrate and knowl-
edge/understanding of life in Europe in the migration
process. This condensed and coded information formed
the basis of the discussion in the next section. For exam-
ple, salient themes that suggested ‘knowledge’ or ‘under-
standing’ of the existence of borders, risks involved in
or realities of migration or life in Europe formed the
basis upon which some informants’ responses were
picked and presented as pieces of evidence in the article.
Attitudes that suggested migrants’ agency such as ‘hard
work’ or ‘try,’ equally informed the analysis and pointed
to their effort and resolve to migrate.
In all, 28 migrants provided this information through
semi-structured interviews conducted as part of the
Swiss Sub-Saharan Africa Migration Network pilot
project. The respondents originated from four coun-
tries of the Horn of Africa including, Ethiopia, Eritrea,
Somalia and Sudan. They all had already started off
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on their journeys to Europe and were, therefore, inter-
viewed en route in Ethiopia. The purposive snowballing
method was deployed to select seven respondents per
country. The Eritrean migrants were interviewed in
refugee camps in Tigray, Ethiopia; Sudanese migrants
were interviewed in the city of Humera, in Tigray, bor-
dering Sudan; and Somalian and Ethiopian migrants
were interviewed in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The pro-
file of informants was inclusive and diverse by design,
capturing respondents by age group, gender and educa-
tional attainment. Fifteen of the respondents indicated
that they were young, 10 said they were young adoles-
cents and three said they were adults. The sample also
included 13 females and 15 males. While graduates of
junior and senior high school (12 and 9, respectively)
dominated the sample, respondents who held diplo-
mas (5) and certificates (2) or that had been trained
in technical and vocational training institutions formed
part of the sample too.
The interviews were conducted from February to
July 2019 and facilitated by researchers in an Ethiopia-
based think tank. No interpreters were necessary, as the
data collectors were native speakers of the languages
in which respondents conversed. The semi-structured
interviews mainly focused on the migrants’ narratives
of their journeys. Follow-up questions sought to draw
out information on how the migrants perceived borders
and the migration processes. All the respondents had
already made the initial move in their sojourn to Europe
and were interviewed in Ethiopia. This distinguishes this
study fromothers of its kind.Other studies interviewpeo-
ple still at ‘home,’ who have not yet initiated but are
pondering migrating, or are failed migrants or returnees
(see, e.g., Alpes, 2016). The initial plan in this study was
to employ the triangulation of methods of data collec-
tion namely, key informant interviews, focus group dis-
cussions and life story narratives. Unfortunately, due to
the outbreak of the 2019 coronavirus disease (Covid-19)
and declaration of the pandemic, it was not possible to
undertake the latter two methods. This is because the
target countries, like the rest of theworld, enforced strict
measures such as the closure of nation-state borders and
restrictions on gatherings, which curbed the mobility of
researchers and ability to hold focus group discussions.
The researchers, therefore, had to limit themselves to
key informant interviews only.
4. The African Migrant, Perceptions and the EU Border
4.1. The Dangers of Irregular Migration and Perceptions
of a Better Life in Europe
Several studies argue that poverty, wars and conflict
characterise Africa and the socioeconomic and politi-
cal realities on the continent (Douma, 2006; Elbadawi
& Sambanis, 2000; Goodhand, 2003; Rustad, 2019).
They go on to posit that this, along with factors such
as environmental degradation, increases the propen-
sity and forces Africans to migrate in search of bet-
ter economic and livelihood opportunities (Dako-Gyeke,
Kodom, Dankyi, & Sulemana, 2020; Flahaux & de
Haas, 2016; Raleigh, 2011; Schwartz, 2018). The stud-
ies argue that Europe is the most preferred destination
by these migrants (Flahaux & de Haas, 2016; Lenoël &
Molinero-Gerbeau, 2018). According to the arguments
presented in these studies, the capital abundant indus-
trial countries of Europe promise better standards of
living and offer socioeconomic prospects and opportu-
nities that are absent in Africa. The promise of higher
wages, greater opportunities for employment and bet-
ter standards of living in EU countries theoretically
present significant pull factors for migrants, according
to these arguments. Accordingly, the migrants have a
nirvana view of EU countries and aspire to live there.
Specifically, economic opportunities including better
jobs and incomes are among most commonly cited pull
factors towards Europe.
Yet, it became clear during interviews with the
migrants who were already in the process of migrating
to Europe from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan that
they had realistic expectations ofwhat lifemight turn out
to be for them after they got to Europe. The expectations
were best underscored by a young male Somali migrant,
who said:
We know that life in Europe is not a bed of roses. Let
alone for migrants, even for Europeans, hard work is
required to have a decent life. There is no easy money
to be collected.We know for sure our familymembers
coming from Europe may not tell us the ugly part of
life in Europe. However, we are very sure that at least
hard work in Europe pays well. With skill and educa-
tion people can succeed a lot. That is why better qual-
ity of life is the attraction for many of us. Otherwise,
racism, religious discrimination against Muslims and
themoral decadence of European sexuality are things
most Africans look at with contempt. (personal com-
munication, 1 April 2020)
Much as they perceived life to be better in Europe, there-
fore, the migrants also expressed that there was no guar-
antee that it would be ‘rosy.’ Actually, the cited young
Somalian assumed that life for Europeans themselves
could be difficult without hard work. And he even ven-
tured to suggest that his family members and relatives
who had been in Europemight hide the ugly reality of dif-
ficult life for people back home who intended to migrate.
But we see one aspect of the migrant’s perception of life
in Europe that contributes to strengthening the resolve
to proceedwithmigrating there. This is the confident per-
ception that hard work in Europe pays well and that skill
and education can lead to success. Moreover, he points
to a better quality of life that presumably comes with
hard work, skill and education. The quality of life hemen-
tions speaks to pull factors of migration (Dustmann &
Okatenko, 2014; Rasool, Botha, & Bisschoff, 2012). But
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over and above this, his assumptions are informed by his
perceived understanding that applying oneself through
hardwork, skill and education produces better outcomes
in Europe.
It is also interesting to see the migrant lowered his
expectations and revealed a sober judgement of what
he expected of a life that even threatens racism and dis-
crimination based on his religious orientation in Europe.
However, even that does not seem to have changed the
perception of his country of origin (just like the young
Eritrean man cited in the next sub-section and his nega-
tive view based on the uncle’s killing and father’s impris-
onment) and the destination.
Further, it was evident from the responses obtained
from all respondents that they too, just like the young
Somalian respondent above, knew the dangers and risks
involved in irregularmigration verywell. In fact, the ques-
tion was asked if the journey to EU countries was worth
making given the obstacles that existed on theway.Most
of the respondents framed the issue as an existential
matter. A young adolescent Somali female’s revelation
in this regard was intriguing. She said:
People think that migrants do not know the risks
involved. They consider us as innocent victims of fasci-
nating stories created by human traffickers. This is not
true at all. We are very realistic. We have not better
life that would not allow us to take risk anyway. Life
is all about opportunity cost. If the opportunity cost
of going was more expensive than staying at home
and languish in poverty and miserable life, why do
you think people would decide to migrate than stay
at home. It is a pure gamble. If you stay you are going
to die of poverty anyway. Why not trying to achieve
something meaningful or die trying. (personal com-
munication, 21 April 2020)
The young lady raised interesting issues in her response.
Castles (2004, pp. 209-210) underscores the role of
migrant agency as a key issue in explanations of why
the migration policies of European states and suprana-
tional organisations fail. In her response, the young ado-
lescent Somali lady in this regard shrugs off victimhood
and projects herself as a realistic risk taker. Her response
corroborates Castles’ argument that migrants are social
beings who actively shape the migratory process in the
quest for better outcomes for sending families and com-
munities and themselves. The Somali lady also seems to
be very calculating as she demonstrates that she made
a cost-benefit analysis of migrating. She exhibits reason-
ing that is beyond the motive to migrate associated with
the notion that leaving her country is better than staying
(Alpes, 2016). And her view that the migration process
is “a pure gamble” not only confirms her conscious risk-
taking attitude but the strong resolve to proceed, based
on theway that she contrasts it with themotive to stay at
home and die. She, like a young adolescent Eritreanmale
and a female adult Sudanese respondent, also knew that
among the obstacles she was likely to face on her jour-
ney was the “death during travel” or “death on the sea”
(personal communications, 8 April 2020, 4 May 2020,
20 May 2020). In fact, all respondents said they knew
that the possibility existed of dying or getting captured
along the way. They based this on what they had seen
on television, their smart phones or heard from friends.
Nonetheless, they would continue with the journey. The
migrants seemed to be fully aware of both the dangers
and risks involved in irregular migration and that they
might not achieve a better life in Europe. Yet, this did not
dampen their resolve to proceed with the migration.
4.2. Intentions to Migrate and Perceptions of European
Borders
The resolve to migrate by the key informants is strongly
expressed in the views of a young Eritrean male migrant:
Once you left your country to migrate to a for-
eign land, there is no alterative to perseverance and
patience. I am not going back to Eritrea to the hand
of a butcher that killed my uncle and imprisoned my
father. If this time it failed, I will keep on trying until it
is realized. I will not tire or retire until I make it. That is
how thousands of Eritreans made it to Europe cross-
ing treacherous terrains and the sea. (personal com-
munication, 8 April 2020)
His response indicates a couple of issues in his resolve to
continue with the migration to Europe. The issues actu-
ally extend beyond themotive (that drove him to embark
on his journey in the first instance) that leaving is bet-
ter. First, migrating to him was the only option. And that
option demanded perseverance mixed with patience.
Based on this, second is therefore the expression that he
was prepared to never stop until he made it to Europe
as desired. His resolve in this regard corroborates evi-
dence in some studies that reveals that undocumented
migrants employ complex strategies to weather forced
repatriation through processes of return (Galvin, 2015;
Kleist, 2017). Galvin’s examination of undocumented
Zimbabwean labour migrants in Botswana, for example,
shows that they experience deportation as a constant
threat and not a single event and this has become a
normal part of their daily transnational lives. Third, the
young Eritrean was inspired in his resolve to keep on try-
ing by the success of thousands of fellow Eritreans gone
before him. So too, the view that they made it to Europe
because they did “not tire or retire” until they made it.
Fourth, it is noteworthy that the young migrant’s resolve
was also driven by a negative perception based on neg-
ative experiences back home. That gave him the resolve
not to return. Lastly, therefore, the migrant’s response
helps underscore the suggestion I make that a proper
understanding of African migration in the 21st century,
particularly towards destinations outside of Africa, is no
exception insofar as concerns the need to go beyond
Social Inclusion, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 1, Pages 257–267 261
dominant and widely held rational economics models
of migration as well as advancements that integrate
motivations andmigrants’ subjectivities regarding migra-
tion possibilities.
The young Eritrean’s response and those of other
migrants raise the question why they are so determined
to migrate and do not see turning back as an option.
An overlooked element that can be gleaned from the
young Eritrean’s response is political motivation. He had
relatives killed and imprisoned in Eritrea. This made him
an asylum seeker who might face death or prison back
home. His experience shows that it is not just economic
factors that might be significant in migrants’ resolve to
migrate. Political motivations have a role to play too. It is
actually argued that many Eritreans living outside of the
country are not ready to return because of human rights
violations and they are opposed to the government there
(Ambroso, Crisp, & Albert, 2011). Eritrea is known for
compulsory conscription of youths into unlimited mili-
tary service. This is besides the restrictionswhich the gov-
ernment imposes on people’s various freedoms like free-
dom of movement, freedom of expression and freedom
of religion. The absence of meaningful political contes-
tation that is evident in the hard-handed way in which
opposition groups are treated; the absence of free, fair
and regular elections; the arbitrary detentions; as well
as persecutions of many people because of their ethnic-
ity, social and political orientations or religion indicate
the challenging political conditions, governance environ-
ments and systemic issues that compel some people in
Eritrea and some of its neighbours to migrate (Nshimbi,
2018). Many studies and majority of policies posit that
migration from such countries is largely driven by eco-
nomic factors, which boil down to poverty and that the
migration could be discouraged by highlighting the risks
of migration. Information provided by migrants and fur-
ther analysis, however, seem to suggest that focusing
solely on the risks of migration ignores the risk of staying
home or returning as respondents quoted in this article
make clear.
The migrants also knew that nation-state borders
existed and expected to encounter both the EU borders
and the agencies and officials that enforce them. The
migrants’ knowledge of borders and enforcers resonates
with the function of borders with respect to the cross-
border movement of people and international migration.
Borders in this respect are regulators of the movement
of people, besides goods and services (Nshimbi, 2019;
Wilson & Donnan, 2012). They determine who should
move, or not, between and across state territories. This
is worth pointing out here because, generally, Africans
should obtain a visa before traveling to Europe to not
only permit their entry but also stipulate the purpose of
travel. As alluded to so far, the migrants discussed in this
article travel to EUmember states for purposes of engag-
ing in work. However, they lacked the visas required for
them to enter Europe. Hence the label irregularmigrants.
Because they travel outside of the regulations, laws and
international agreements that govern the movement of
people between/across state territories (see, e.g., Sironi,
Bauloz, & Emmanuel, 2019; International Convention,
1990). Hence, also, the discussion of their experiences
in this article.
All the informants were fully cognisant of the bor-
der, border policies and requirements. They also knew
the consequences of encountering the border and bor-
der agencies if they did not possess the necessary visa
or travel documents. But they had resolved to make
the journey, nonetheless. An overwhelming majority of
the migrants said they expected to meet European bor-
der officials in the course of the journey and only a
few believed they would not. Among the former group
of respondents, a young adolescent Sudanese female
and a young adolescent Ethiopian male expressed the
conviction that it was rare to escape the scrutiny of
European border officials because the border officials
were equipped with high technological systems for
detecting the infiltration of migrants through their bor-
ders (personal communications, 18May 2020). Although
they did not specify the technological systems, a system
towhich they could have been referringmight be the one
that Spain deploys in its approach to irregular migration
management where it focuses on detecting and appre-
hending irregular migrants early (Carling & Hernández-
Carretero, 2011). The sistema integrado de vigilancia
exterior (SIVE), as the system is called, centrally coor-
dinates the interception of suspicious vessels based on
information transmitted from mobile devices about the
vessels to a central command. There is also EURODAC, a
software system that captures asylum seekers’ biomet-
ric information that is shared between EUmembers. The
members can then use it to detect abuse such as applica-
tions for asylum in multiple member states.
Among the informants who believed they would not
encounter border officials, a young adolescent female
Sudanese, a young adolescent male Sudanese and a
young adolescent female Somalian went on to say that
EU borders were porous and easy to infiltrate (personal
communications, 18 May 2020, 19 April 2020). They
cited the influx of Syrianmigrants into Southern Italy and
that of West Africans into Spain via the Canary Islands to
prove their claims.
But most of those who expected to encounter EU
borders and officials said they expected the officials
would be unwelcoming, cruel to themand uncompromis-
ing. A young adolescent Eritrean migrant from May Ayni
refugee camp put it this way:
We know what the Italian border guards did to our
people during the tragedy of Lampedusa. It could
have been avoided. The migrants’ cry for help was
denied. Humanitarian support from a humanitarian
rescue organization working on helping migrants was
curtailed. They left them to die on the sea as a deter-
rent measure to other migrants. I do not expect any
positive gesture from them at all. Yet, I will try my
Social Inclusion, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 1, Pages 257–267 262
chance of sneaking around and getting to Europe
unnoticed. (personal communication, 8 April 2020)
This migrant’s response shows what he expected of the
border officials in the anticipated encounter. It also
shows his full knowledge and that he was well informed
about the goings-on at the border, in border encoun-
ters with officials of EU member countries. He did not
expect any positive outcome from an encounter with the
border or in interactions with border officials. He knew,
based on the experience to which he referred that even
death at sea was possible. However, he resolved to pro-
ceed and take chances to sneak around the border. This
shows that neither the prospect of being harshly treated
nor the threat of suffering the most extreme and nega-
tive form of outcomes—death—in themigration process
dampened the respondent’s resolve to continue.
Despite the challenges and negative experiences that
all the migrants anticipated to encounter with European
borders and officials, all of them insisted they would
nonetheless continue with the migration. We see here,
again, determination to enter EU territory. This super-
seded the anticipation of bordersmarked by physical and
technological infrastructure, stringent border enforce-
ment and “unwelcoming,” “cruel” and “uncompromis-
ing” border agencies and officials. It also superseded
other measures designed to deter migration to Europe
such as information campaigns that highlight the risks
of migration.
4.3. Deterring Irregular Migration to EU Countries and
Information Campaigns
Several research and policy studies recommend equip-
ping (intending) irregular migrants with early legal and
realistic information about risks and the dangers of
migration (Angeli, Dimitriadi, & Triandafyllidou, 2014;
Omelaniuk, 2012; Triandafyllidou & Maroukis, 2012).
However, the evidence provided so far shows migrants’
resolve to migrate notwithstanding such information.
The informants clearly suggested that information cam-
paigns designed to inform migrants en route to Europe
about the risks or dangers of irregular migration are
unlikely to significantly impact or deter them from
migrating. Their responses to questions on where they
obtained information about the migration process, the
EU and life in EU countries provide further evidence of
their resolve in the face of information campaigns and
knowledge that risks and dangers of migration were an
actual reality. A young adolescent Eritrean migrant had
this to say about that reality:
I learned from colleagues who made it to Italy and
Germany that there is great risk of losing one’s life and
being kept prisoner of the human traffickers operat-
ing from Libya. I think I must cross at least five coun-
tries before getting to Germany. I already crossed one
from Eritrea to Ethiopia. Then via Sudan to Egypt and
Libya then finally to Italy andGermany. (personal com-
munication, 8 April 2020)
This migrant had his route planned out and information
campaigns to dissuade him, let alone his own knowl-
edge of risks and dangers, could not cause a rethink of
his planned passage through Sudan, Egypt, Libya and
on to Italy and Germany. Actually, a young Sudanese
migrant seemed to suggest that not even information on
social media platforms could reliably inform decisions to
rethink migration:
Social media is open to misinformation and disin-
formation. There is no mechanism of making sure
that everything you get from social media is right.
However, it remains to be one of the sources of infor-
mation for migrants. Specially this is vital in alerting
violent incidents happening on migration routes like
the capsizing of migrants. (personal communication,
29 May 2020)
Social media for this migrant seemed to mainly have
been a means through which to obtain important infor-
mation about incidences of violence onmigration routes.
The response seems to suggest that the migrant relied
more on family abroad as an information source and not
campaigns on migration risk and dangers. This was con-
firmed by a response of another migrant who said:
As you know it very well almost every family have at
least one member of the family in diaspora. We keep
close contacts with family members in Europe to
get valuable information about the route and life in
Europe. As many who used the same information
and made it to Europe later confirm to us, there
is no reason to doubt the information they provide
us. We believe it is true. (personal communication,
8 April 2020)
It is very clear from the cited responses that, if anything,
the migrants possess state of the art information about
the world in general and their intended destinations in
particular. Themajority of themwere actually connected
through smart phones and used them to obtain current
virtual information. The information also included sto-
ries and images of people like them, attempting to make
the journey to Europe but got intercepted, rescued or
drowned in the Mediterranean Sea. And some of these
events occurred on the same Mediterranean routes the
migrants were planning to use. All the respondents also
disclosed that they used their phones to communicate
with families and friends back home, to keep them
informed about their situation in the migration process.
They also revealed that they used the phones to com-
municate with friends and members of families abroad,
to keep connected with other migrants who were in
the process of migrating and, some, to communicate
with traffickers to get route information and information
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about destination country. The point to make out of
this is that information campaigns aimed at dissuading
migrants from engaging in irregular migration (Brekke
& Thorbjørnsrud, 2018; Musarò, 2019; Nieuwenhuys &
Pécoud, 2007) may not only carry similar information to
what themigrants are already exposed and fail to discour-
age them from migrating. But migrants have access to
other information sources too.
Therefore, it is also possible and easy for them to
use their own sources to either substantiate or refute
information presented in those campaigns. In fact, when
asked how they learned about the countries to which
they were migrating many of the migrants listed fam-
ily members abroad, friends in those destination coun-
tries or returnees, social media, television and radio,
other migrants, brokers and human traffickers. Hence,
the knowledge available to migrants about their destina-
tion, indeed, influences the decision to migrate. But put
together, it is clear that for the most part, the informa-
tion that feeds the migrants is from people with whom
they are connected or in their networks. The majority of
them obtained their information from families, friends,
other migrants and brokers and very few from social
media, television and radio sources combined. The ques-
tion, thus, is which of the two information sources—
their own or that from information campaigns—do they
appropriate and use as bases upon which to make migra-
tion decisions. From the evidence presented here, we
can say human connections and not information cam-
paigns constitute dominant and, therefore, more influ-
ential sources of information for migrants about des-
tination country. The extent to which this information
is accurate, especially when compared with that pro-
duced in information campaigns, is subject to debate.
The extent to which it is received and believed in ways
that make it contribute to migrants’ resolve to migrate
cannot be disputed.
5. Concluding Remarks
I conclude the article by moving away from the data to
briefly muse over some of its implications for borders,
information campaigns, civil society/academic scholar-
ship, and, generally, the role that migrants’ resolutions
play in migration processes. My study of migrants from
the Horn of African, who had already started off on
their journeys and were in the migration process, chal-
lenges the idea that restrictive borders, policies and prac-
tices are a very effective way of stopping irregular migra-
tion. It equally questions the effectiveness of information
campaigns that target (would-be) migrants to discour-
age them frommigrating to Europe by touting restrictive
borders and practices and highlighting risks and dangers
of migration. Regarding the former, measures as well as
physical and soft(ware) infrastructure and technologies
are actually in place to ‘protect’ or ‘secure’ Europe’s bor-
ders (Andersson, 2016). But their effectiveness is ques-
tionable. This is in view of the reality highlighted in the
introduction of this article that irregular migration from
the Horn of Africa continues post the so-called 2015
migration crisis. And concerning the latter, other stud-
ies corroborate the information provided by migrants
in this article that underscores the failure of advanced
and sophisticated technologies and border control mea-
sures to curb irregular migration from Africa (see, e.g.,
Andersson, 2016; Castles, 2004). Targeted information
about dangers of migration and sombre stories of irreg-
ular immigrants’ lives in Europe seem to have achieved
little in terms of a rethink about embarking on unknown
journeys among migrants too. Approaches to address-
ing irregular migration that deploy information cam-
paigns are informed by rational choice assumptions that
migrants desperately want to escape poverty, war and
are attracted by prospects of better life in destination
countries. If migrants are informed about the perils of
irregular migration, the recommendation goes, they will
not migrate. However, the migrants in this article said
they were very aware of potential dangers they faced in
migratory journeys but resolved to migrate nonetheless.
The Horn of Africa, from which all the informants origi-
nated, has long and continues to be a major source of
migrants destined to Europe. They continue to migrate
despite the information towhich they are exposed about
the risks ofmigration and the touted protective and secu-
rity measures to curb their movements.
In view of this, this article has attempted to extend
research that centres on the role of aspirations and
desires in migration to underscore the importance
of migrants’ resolve in shaping migration decisions.
Attempts to understand irregular migration should tran-
scend rational economic choice interpretations and
rather consider how migrants themselves see the mea-
sures informed by such theoretical views and designed
to regulate their movement. Migrants are already fully
aware of the physical barriers to migration and the dan-
gers and risks involved in irregular migration. This reality
demands a better understanding of the migrants, apart
from a fixation with enforcing borders. The article has
shown that themigrants either have a dismissive attitude
of EU borders and downplay their effectiveness or are
ready to encounter them and the border officials. Their
resolve makes them ready to keep on trying to cross into
EU territory to the point of death.
This finding is consistent with Belloni’s (2016, 2019)
examination of secondary refugeemovements in Europe
triggered by unpalatable conditions in the refugees’
first country of arrival. Whereas the refugees would be
expected to stay in that country, or to even return to
their country of origin, it is shown that the EU’smigration
policies driven by the intention of the Dublin Regulation
to stop the refugees from seeking asylum in second EU
countries fail to prevent the refugees from doing so.
The refugees mediate the effect of such policies with
the way in which they perceive risk; with what they
expect of migration; and how they view the EU pol-
icy restrictions as barriers which they must overcome
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and not hindrances to their migration (Belloni, 2016).
On its part, this article has shown that even when still
in Africa, migrants expect to face physical obstacles and
even the threat of losing life itself, during the migration
process. They are already aware of the tightened policies
designed to restrict entry into Europe and are also well
informed about restrictive border measures, infrastruc-
ture and software such as SIVE and EURODAC. Yet, they
set their eyes on attaining to the life to which they aspire
in Europe. This implies that fixation with the physical bar-
riers at the margins of the EU as the point at which to
curb irregularmigration is counterproductive as the asso-
ciated activities are ineffective.
The determination to migrate also, finally, indicates
a couple of issues the literature on migration tends
to either misrepresent or fails to emphasise. It dispels
assumptions that migrants in Africa embark on journeys
for which they lack information. Majority of the infor-
mants in this article had smart phones, which they used
for communication and to access information and news
on world events and their desired destinations. This cor-
roborates Carling and Hernández-Carretero (2011), who
contrary to Koser and Pinkerton’s (2002) assertion that
informal social networks of migrants spread stale infor-
mation about conditions and policies in destination coun-
tries, argue that themigrants consider themselves better
informed to the extent that they dismiss as biased propa-
ganda, any seemingly biased information in campaigns
that warn of the risks of migration. The resolve, there-
fore, also indicates migrant agency, an important con-
sideration for any who would want to properly under-
stand irregular migration from Africa. The point must
be emphasised that irregular migrants are neither mere
rational economic actors nor passive and helpless victims
in migration processes. They are perceptive in an aspira-
tional manner and this drives them to take risk to the
point of a daring perseverance in migration processes.
Push factors such as harsh political and governance con-
ditions only strengthen the migrants’ agentive resolve
to move on and not return and face possible death or
imprisonment. Initiatives other than those that attempt
to inhibit movement but understand, are sensitive to,
and include the perceptions of migrants are more likely
to effectively grapplewith the challenges associatedwith
irregular migration.
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